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Tell It Like It Is Doctor!
A Discussion of Reasonable
Medical Probability in Kentucky
By JOE C. SAVAGE*
For several months following an automobile accident, your
client complains of headaches, dizziness, vertigo, some nausea
and occasional difficulty in properly focusing his eyes. He tells
you that although the collision resulted in only minor property
damage to the vehicles involved, his head struck the wind-
shield, and that this was the cause of his symptoms. He has not
seen a physician. How are you going to prove that the blow to
your client's head is the direct and proximate cause of his com-
plants? Do you need medical testimony? If so, how sure of his
opinion must your medical witness be (1) before he is allowed
to give it and (2) before you have met your burden of proof on
this issue of causation?
You are defending against a plaintiff who alleges to have suf-
fered a ruptured intervetebral disk in the cervical area at the
C-6, C-7 interspace, causing severe neck pain and radiating left
arm pain, as a result of being rear-ended by your client's insured.
You know the plaintiff is forty-five years old and suspect that
this neck and arm pain was caused not by the accident but by
degenerative athritis, which is common to persons of this age
and which can easily produce these same symptoms. What kind
of evidence must plaintiff's counsel offer to establish a direct
casual relationship between the accident and the ruptured disc?
As attorney for the widow and four children of a forty-two
year old carpenter who suffered a fatal heart attack at work, you
*B.A., University of Oklahoma (1961); LL.B., University of Kentucky
(1964); LL.M., Harvard University (1965); Adjunct Instructor of Law, Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law; Adjunct Instructor of Pathology, University
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would like to obtain maximum death benefits under workmen's
compensation. How do you prove that the heart attack was work
connected?
A woman claims to have swallowed pieces of glass while
drinking a coke, and now complains of all types of bizarre
symptoms. How do you prepare to defend such a claim?
A twenty-three year old boy is knocked from his motorcycle,
suffering minor fractures and the usual bumps and bruises. Three
months later, diabetes mellitus is diagnosed. Can you prove a
causal relationship?
Turning for a moment from the problem of causation, what
about the problem of future damages? Suppose, at trial, you prove
that your client, a twenty year old boy, suffered a closed head in-
jury. Your neurosurgeon is prepared to testify that statistics show
that this boy has a five per cent chance of suffering from epilepsy
at some time in the future. Can you get such testimony in? As-
suming that this is all the testimony on future medical problems,
can you get an instruction on future pain and suffering and loss
of earning capacity?
Suppose your client, at the time of trial, continues to suffer
low back pain, and his treating doctor is prepared to testify that
such pain will likely continue, and that the best way to relieve
it would be to perform disc surgery and fuse the vertebrae. Is
such testimony too speculative? Can you get instructions on
medical and doctor bills, future pain and suffering, and loss of
earning capacity?
A doctor testifies that he cannot be absolutely sure of anything
in medicine, but that its "possible" that plaintiff will never be
able to go back to work. Too speculative?
How can the attorney chart his way through such a rough
and uncertain wilderness? What are the rules?
WHAT AFTER ALL, MUST Tim P&ui~iF Pov-B?
In any personal injury negligence action, the plaintiff, to win,
must establish by the preponderance of the evidence:
1. A duty on the part of the defendant,
2. A breach of that duty,
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3. A direct and proximate causal relationship between
breach and injury suffered, and
4. Injury or damage.
Concerning duty, the plaintiff must produce evidence which
will establish a duty on the part of the defendant to act as the
reasonably prudent person in same or similar circumstances.
Concerning breach, the plaintiff must produce evidence which
will establish that the defendant did not conform to this reason-
able man standard. For the purposes of this paper, we may as-
sume that both duty and breach have been established.
Concerning causation, the plaintiff must produce evidence
which will establish that the injuries for which the plaintiff asks
to be compensated were caused, directly and proximately, by
the defendant's breach of duty. What type of evidence must this
be, and how persuasive must it be to warrant an instruction on
defendant's basic liability?
Concerning injury or damage, the plaintiff, at the time of trial,
must produce evidence which will establish any one or more of
six possible elements of damage:
1. Past medical expenses,1
2. Past earnings lost,2
3. Past pain and suffering,"
4. Future medical expenses,4
5. Future loss of earning capacity, and5
6. Future pain and suffering.6
Presenting evidence to prove the first three should cause little
difficulty. But what type of evidence must be presented and how
persuasive must it be to warrant an instruction on the latter
three?
Turning for a moment from a personal injury negligence
action, what must a plaintiff establish to justify an award in
workmen's compensation. He must prove:
1 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 102 (1965).
2 Id. § 90.
3 Id § 105.
4 Id. § 102.
51d. § 92.
Old. § 106.
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1. The employer and employee were under the act,
2. Injury, and
3. The injury arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment.
As in a personal injury case, then, a workmen's compensation
plaintiff must establish causation by showing that his injury was
work connected. He also must present evidence on future in-
jury if he is to obtain an award for permanent disability.
Through this article, then, we are talking about two distinct
problems:
(1) Proof of causation from the breach of duty (per-
sonal injury case) or the work duties (compensation
case) to the injury, and
(2) The injury now having been established, proof of its
future consequence and duration.
Tim MEDICAL EXPET
As will be discussed later, the proof of causation and the
proof of future injury usually involve testimony offered in court,
or in a deposition, by a medical doctor. Too often this testimony
is vague, uncertain and confusing.
One doctor says this or that "could" happen. Another says it
"would." Another says "maybe," or "possible." Still a third says
it's "likely."
"I would expect to see" such a result. "I can't be sure, but
this can happen." "This may happen, if .... " "These symptoms
are consistent with" a particular type of trauma.
One doctor's "could" is another's "would." Two doctors have
the same opinion, yet one expresses it in terms of "possibility,"
the other "probability."
What is the nature of medical testimony that it should be so
difficult to express? Must we forever be wary of this quagmire of
semantics?
We have all heard it said that "medicine is not an exact
science." Some assert that it is not a science at all, but only an
art. What label is used is unimportant; the understanding and
[Vol. 58
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appreciation the lawyer has of the basic nature of medical know-
ledge is all important.
The touchstone of medical knowledge is the opinion of the
doctor. Everything else is subservient. Medical history, physical
examinations, X-rays, laboratory procedures, special diagnostic
tests-all are merely steps taken along the way by the doctor so
that he can finally reach a medical opinion."
Of course, opinions are not absolute facts. This means that
no doctor can testify with absolute certainty, and that there are
few, if any, areas of medicine free of conflicting opinions. The
human body being the complex mechanism that it is, medical
knowledge is and will probably continue to be unsettled. Lawyers
will forever be exposed to the "educated medical guess."
So when a doctor testifies, all he can bring to court is what he
has-his opinion. The attorney should not demand more from
his medical witness than he can give. Neither should the court.
CAusATioN--"ETioLoGY"
What evidence must the plaintiff introduce to sustain his
burden of proof on the issue of whether the defendant's breach
of duty was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs injury?
Or, if in workmen's compensation, whether the injury was work
connected?
The study of the causes of injury or disease in medicine is
known as "etiology." What the attorney is really trying to prove,
then, is the etiology of his client's injury. Thus, in the hypo-
thetical fact situations posed at the beginning, did the trauma
suffered by the plaintiff in an automobile accident cause head-
aches, nausea and dizziness? Did the stress of work cause a heart
attack? Can trauma cause diabetes?
Etiology of injury is a medical issue, and usually must be
proven by a medical witness. This is true because only a physician
has the knowledge and expertise to make inferences and draw
conclusions, hence give an opinion, from medical facts.
But, you say, it takes no medical genius to know that the
plaintiff's lascerations of the face were caused by his going
7 M. Howrs, LA vYR's GumE To MErnCAL PRoOF (1966).
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through the windshield. And, of course, you are correct. Where
the cause of injury is obvious to the layman, medical testimony
on causation is not required.
The Court of Appeals has long recognized these doctrines.
The most recent example is Tatham v. Palmer.8 In that case, the
plaintiff, an eighteen year old boy, suffered headaches after strik-
ing his head against the windshield. Without medical testimony,
the Court held that the plaintiff's burden of proof on causation
had been met.' The Court pointed out that circumstantial evi-
dence may be sufficient in some cases to prove causation. "[lIt
is within the realm of common knowledge that a severe blow to
the head will cause headaches . . . ."10 The test is, then, what is
within the realm of common knowledge.
But what is within such realm has been more obvious to the
Court than it has to me on several occasions. The Court once
held, for example, in Cumberland Railroad Company v. Baird,"
that a woman's testimony that she suffered a miscarriage after
falling off a horse when it stumbled at a defective railroad cross-
ing was sufficient, without medical testimony, to establish causa-
tion. At least two obstetrics and gynocology specialists have told
me that it is extremely unlikely that such trauma would produce
such a result.
Of course, taking a plaintiff's case to court without medical
testimony would be foolish, and, as a practical matter, seldom
occurs. The real question, then, is not whether medical testimony
is needed, but rather, whether the medical testimony given is
sufficient to prove causation? Or, to state it from a different frame
of reference, how certain must the doctor be of his opinion in
order for the plaintiff to establish causation?
There is one old Kentucky case which infers that the doctor
need only testify that the injury "could" have been caused by
the trauma. In Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v.
Braymer,2 the issue was whether Braymer's abdominal tumor
was caused by his striking his stomach on the seat in front when
the train lurched unexpectedly. Plaintiff's medical testimony was
8439 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1969).
9 See also Jarboe v. Hasting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965); Johnson v. Vaughn,
370 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1963).
10 439 S.W.2d at 939.
-11 6 Ky. 225, 160 S.W. 919 (1913).
12 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 1098, 39 S.W. 24 (1897).
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"It could have." The Court held this was suflficient medical proof.
Plaintiff's counsel can take little comfort from this antique,
however. Kentucky law for many years thereafter ignored this
decision and held that the doctor must testify on causation with
"reasonable probability." As with other concepts of negligence,
such as duty and breach, causation must be proven by the pre-
ponderance of evidence. It must, then, be probable.
Southern Mining Company v. Cornelius,13 for example, held
that plaintiff's medical testimony, to the effect that the plaintiff's
hearing loss "could" have been caused by defendant's explosion,
was too speculative and would not meet plaintiff's burden on
causation.14
Jarboe v. Harting5 presents a classic discussion of causation.
In Jarboe, a malpractice case, plaintiff's medical testimony that
the operation "could" have caused her miscarriage was held not
sufficient. It is interesting to further note that the court also held
in Jarboe that causation could not be established without medical
evidence because the cause of this miscarriage was not "so ap-
parent that laymen with a general knowledge would have no
difficulty in recognizing it."'" Evidently, the miscarriage in Jarboe
wasn't as obvious as the miscarriage in Baird.
Bartley v. Childers'7 is the last case I can find on this issue. A
wrongful death case, Bartley holds that medical testimony that
death "most likely" was caused by asphyxiation by drowning
satisfies the probability rule. The Court suggested that all that is
required is that the testimony be strong enough to warrant "an
inference of causation," as opposed to speculation, surmise or
guesswork. After noting that the line between what is speculative
proof and what is circumstantial or inferential proof is sometimes
dim and uncertain, the Court quoted from Highway Transport
Company v. Daniel Baker Company 8 that the plaintiff's burden
is to "'introduce sufficient proof to tilt the balance from possibility
to probability."-19
'3 284 Ky. 515, 145 S.W.2d 93 (1940).14 KY. DIGESr Damages, Key 185 (1952), contains a list of cases on the issue
of sufficiency of evidence on causation in personal injury cases.15397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965).
16 Id. at 778.
17433 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1968).
18 398 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1965).
19 433 S.W.2d at 132.
1970]
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Workmen's compensation law has had the probability rule on
causation for some time. The doctor testifying that the trauma at
work "would" or "probably" caused the injury satisfied this rule.
"Could" or "possibly," however, did not.
The heart attack cases in workmen's compensation have been
particularly troublesome. With almost the same set of facts, cases
have gone both for and against the plaintiff, depending upon
the language of the testifying doctors. Thus in Terry v. Associated
Stone Company,20 and in Crimes v. Goodlett and Adams,21 the
doctors testified that the stress at work precipitated the attack, or
that the causation was reasonably probable, so the plaintiffs won.
In Dupriest v. Tecon Corporation22 and Kelly Contracting Com-
pany v. Robinson, 3 the medical testimony on causation was only
that such an attack was "possibly" a result of stress at work, so the
plaintiffs lost.
Perhaps the highwater mark in the probability rule in causa-
tion cases came with Inland Steel Company v. Johnson,24 a 1969
case. Also a workmen's compensation heart attack case, dictum
suggests that even if the doctor uses the word "possible," his
testimony should not, therefore, be discounted, but should be
examined carefully from start to finish, within the total context of
his testimony, to determine whether he really meant "probable."
The Court cited McNiece, Heart Disease and the Law (Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 1961) at page 136,
Physicians differ in the degree of caution or lack of caution
with which they phrase their opinions, and one man's 'pos-
sibility' may be equivalent to another's 'probability.' It is sub-
mitted that, except where the use of the term 'possibility,' or
other words of similar import, is indicative of an over-all
viewpoint, the mere employment of such language should not
be, as it is in some states, a basis for disregarding the parti-
cular physician's testimony. Substance should prevail over
form, and the expert's testimony should be examined in its
total meaning, rather than word by word.25
20 334 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1960).
21845 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1961).
22 896 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965).
23 377 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1964).
24 439 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1969).
25 Id. at 563, n. 2.
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So "probability" is the test. Even "possibility" will not be held
insufficient on its face, but will be examined to see if "probable"
was really intended.
But there are still too many questions unanswered. What is
probability? It has never been defined. Is it a chance? A better
than even chance? More likely than not? 51-49? 75-25?
I submit that probability in the area of causation should
mean "more likely than not." After all, the plaintiffs burden is
only to establish his case by the preponderance of the evidence.
Testimony that it is more likely than not that a particular breach
of duty caused this injury would be a preponderance.
FUTuRE DAIArGEs-"PRoGNosIs"
Future damages, that is, future medical expenses, loss of
earning capacity and future pain and suffering involve a pre-
diction of the future medical course of the patient. This, in medi-
cal jargon, is "prognosis." What evidence must the plaintiff intro-
duce to sustain his burden of proof if he is to get an instruction
authorizing recovery for these future damages?
As with causation, prognosis is a medical issue and usually
must be proven by a medical witness. Also, as in caustation, how-
ever, where it is within the realm of common knowledge that a
person will continue to incur these future damages, medical
testimony is not required.
Thus, concerning future pain and suffering, where it is fairly
obvious that a person will continue to suffer pain after the trial,
medical testimony on future pain and suffering is not required.26
Whether medical testimony is necessary depends to a large ex-
tent on the nature of the injury involved.
Concerning future loss of earning capacity, the same rule
applies. In Smith v. Hamm,27 the Court held that testimony of the
loss of an important organ (spleen) was sufficient to warrant a
finding of permanent injury and an award for damages therefor
without medical testimony.
Concerning future medical expense, I could find no cases but
would think that the same rule applies.
Again, as in the area of causation, to take to trial a personal
injury case without medical testimony on future damages would
2 6 See Williams v. Kirtley, 263 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1953).27 314 Ky. 339, 235 S.W.2d 437 (1950).
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be foolish. So the practical question, again, is not whether medi-
cal testimony is necessary, but rather, whether the medical testi-
mony is sufficient to prove these damages.
Rogers v. Sullivan2 8 changed prior case law in this area of
prognosis. The Court had previously held in Ingram v. Galliher,29
It is an established rule that to warrant recovery for per-
manent injuries, the future effect of the injuries sustained
must be shown with reasonable certainty. The evidence must
be positive and satisfactory, although it need not conclusively
show the condition to be permanent. So, a mere conjecture
or even probability of lasting disability does not warrant re-
covery for permanent impairment of earning power.30
As late as 1966, the Court in Townsend v. Stampere1 held
similarly as in Ingram.
Rogers overrules such nonsense. As Judge Palmore points
oute2 in that opinion, all we are talking about is damages and in
order to obtain an instruction authorizing recovery for damages,
the fact of damages must be taken out of the area of speculation.
This is the rule generally applicable to proof of compensatory
damages; it is not peculiar to personal injury cases. Where
damages are too speculative, they should not be allowed. Judge
Palmore then relates probability to speculation, holding that testi-
mony of "probable" future damages removes the fact of damage
from the area of speculation and warrants an instruction.
Rogers has been followed once, in Jones v. Skiles.33 The case
will probably be cited for a long time. But Rogers is important
from still another viewpoint. Possibility, probability and certainty
have long confused lawyers in the phrasing of their questions to
the medical witness. To remove such semantic stumbling blocks,
Judge Palmore wrote,
It seems to us that it would be proper simply to ask the
witness for his opinion as to the prospects of recovery, and
let him explain as he wishes. [citations omitted.] The thing
28410 S.W.2d 624 (Ky. 1967).
29 809 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1958).
sod. at 766-67.
31398 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1966).
32410 S.W.2d at 628.
33434 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1968).
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that counts is what he says; the question need only open the
subject.34
This is important, then, because the doctor can testify as to
prognosis any way he sees fit, even if he feels there is only a
"possibility" of future damage. And the question which opens up
this topic need not contain the phrase "based on reasonable
medical probability," or anything else.
The rule seems to be, then, that in order to get an instruction
on future damages, probability of such damage is required; to
get testimony from the doctor, the question need not call for an
opinion based on probability. All the doctor need to do is "tell
it like it is."
What does "probable" mean in this area of future damage?
The term has never been defined in this area either. Should it
mean the same as in the area of caustation? The Court in Rogers
only intended that future damages not be speculative. It then
adopted "probability" as the test of speculation, without defining
probability.
If we define probability as "more likely than not," as I sug-
gested we do in questions of causation, do we automatically
conclude that anything short of this is too speculative? This may
sound good in theory, but consider again the hypotheticals
posed in the beginning. Is a five per cent certainty of epilepsy at
some time in the future a probable future injury? Too specula-
tive? Would you require a higher percentage?
Neurosurgeons will tell you that the percentage of patients
developing epilepsy at some later time substantially increases
with the severity of the head injury. With an open head injury,
for example, the percentage climbs to fifty per cent or even
higher. Is a forty-nine per cent or even a fifty per cent certainty
of epilepsy a probable future injury?
If you were the five per cent patient seeking redress in court,
wouldn't you want the jury to hear this evidence? Wouldn't you
want an instruction on future pain and suffering and on loss of
earning capacity? Is it fair to require you to be in the fifty-one
per cent or better range to obtain relief?
Prognosis in medicine is probably the least certain of all
34 410 S.W.2d at 627-28.
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areas. Will I need another operation? Will I ever be able to walk?
Will I regain my sight? Will I return to manual labor? All these
questions are, to some extent, speculative in nature. The answers
are based upon past statistical experience applied to the present
condition of the patient. Is it fair to the patient to adopt a
more likely than not" rule in this area?
Rogers already stands for the proposition that the doctor need
only be asked for a prognosis, and then he can explain as he
wishes. The opinion will, therefore, be before the jury. Why not
then give the jury instructions on future damage and let them
calculate the plaintiff's chances any way they see fit?
ANY CHANCE TO REOPEN AFTER JUDGMENT?
The fairest solution to this dilemma would be to allow a
plaintiff to obtain a new trial on damages should his condition
deteriorate. The defendant could do the same thing if the plain-
tiff got better. Of course, this is done in workmen's compensation
quite regularly by a motion to reopen. Is there any authority
which would permit such action in a civil case?
Civil Rule 60.02 provides:
On motion a court may upon such terms as are just, relieve
a party or his legal representative from its final judgment,
order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (1) mis-
take, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59.02; (3) perjury or falsified evidence; (4) fraud affecting
the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence;
(5) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equi-
table that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
and on grounds (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Rule does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation.35
35 Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02.
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If a plaintiff develops epilepsy twenty years after a judgment
is entered, might he be "relieved" of the judgment upon ground
(6)? Sounds pretty far-fetched, doesn't it?
In Anshutz v. Louisville Railway Company,8 the defendant
was held to be relieved of a final judgment upon the grounds of
newly discovered evidence. The plaintiff and two doctors had
testified that because of the trauma suffered by the plaintiff,
both fallopian tubes and the left and most of the right ovaries
were removed, so that the plaintiff was forever barren, and that
the trauma had caused a tumor to develop at the site. Several
months after trial, long after the time for appeal had run, the
tumor became a baby boy!
Anshutz was based on Civil Code, Section 844, the forerunner
of CR 60.02. It is one of the few cases I could find setting aside
a judgment.
The general rule, however, is that courts do not favor the
granting of new trials for newly discovered evidence, particularly
evidence tending to prove a change of physical condition of the
plaintiff. In Woods v. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Company,7
the plaintiff testified she was paralyzed from traumatic neurosis
and recovered $15,000. Naturally the defendant was chagrined
when the plaintiff was seen walking shortly after judgment. With-
out actual proof of fraud, however, the court refused to set aside
the judgment, and distinguished Anshutz by stating that the
plaintiff's testimony in Anshutz was so incorrect as to constitute
fraud and conspiracy on its face. See also Teche Lines v. Boy-
ette,38 which is a Sixth Circuit federal case similar to Woods.
CONCLUSION
While reasonable medical probability is the test in Kentucky,
in both the area of causation and the area of future damage, no
cases really define "probability." Evidently, the doctor can
testify any way he likes, and his testimony will then be examined
in its total context to see whether the probability test has been
satisfied. If it has on causation, the plaintiff will get a liability in-
struction and the case will go to the jury. If it has on future
30152 Ky. 741, 154 S.W. 13 (1913).
37252 Ky. 78, 65 S.W.2d 961 (1933).
38 111 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1940).
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damages, the plaintiff will get instructions on future medical ex-
penses, loss of earning capacity, and future pain and suffering.
If probability be defined as "more likely than not," this would
be an acceptable standard in the area of causation but might work
hardship in the area of future damage. A possible remedy for
such hardship would be to allow the plaintiff to reopen, but
Kentucky law at present really precludes this possibility.
